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ABSTRACT
Technology has become all-important in modern society. For each 
application, it is crucial for society to have a good understanding of the 
risks and benefits involved. However, experts tend to assess the risks very 
differently than the public. One of the main reasons is that experts tend to 
rely on an objective analysis of the facts, whereas laypeople’s judgment is 
also based on other factors, including emotional responses. The question 
remains however whether that is a good thing. Some argue that emotions 
lead to biases and should be treated with great suspicion; others claim 
that the laypeople’s approach to risk is much richer and should also be 
taken into consideration. In this paper, I explore how we can answer 
that important question from an evolutionary perspective. First, I briefly 
outline the role of emotions in judgment and decision making. Next, I 
discuss two approaches that have defended the rationality of emotions: 
Roeser’s concept of emotions as trustworthy indicators of moral risks 
and Kahan’s cultural evaluator theory. Subsequently, I briefly discuss the 
evolution of emotions and their impact on risk assessment. I conclude from 
that account that emotions are not trustworthy guide for policy making.
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RESUMEN
La tecnología ha sobrevenido como algo enormemente relevante en las 
sociedades modernas. En cada nueva aplicación, es crucial que la sociedad 
tenga una adecuada comprensión de los riesgos y de los beneficios de dicha 
tecnología. Sin embargo, los expertos evalúan los riesgos de un modo muy 
diferente a como lo hace la gente común. Una de las razones fundamentales 
es que los expertos se suelen apoyar en un análisis objetivo de los hechos, 
mientras que los juicios que hace la gente se basan también en otros factores, 
incluidas las respuestas emocionales. La cuestión pendiente es si es bueno 
que sea así. Algunos consideran que las emociones pueden generar sesgos y 
deberían ser tratadas con mucho cuidado; otros creen que la perspectiva de 
la gente común sobre el riesgo es mucho más rica de lo que se cree y debería 
también ser tenida en cuenta. En este ensayo exploro esta importante 
cuestión desde una posición evolutiva. Primero, describo brevemente el 
rol que tienen las emociones en nuestros juicios y toma de decisiones. 
Luego, debato dos aproximaciones distintas sobre la racionalidad de las 
emociones: el concepto de emociones de Roeser como indicadores valiosos 
de los riesgos morales y la teoría evolutiva del evaluador cultural de Kahan. 
Como resultado, trato brevemente la evolución de las emociones y su 
impacto en la valoración del riesgo. Concluyo desde ahí que las emociones 
no son guías fiables para la toma de decisiones públicas.
Palabras clave: Emociones; Evaluación de riesgos; Evolución; Raciona-
lidad; Repugnancia.
1. Emotions in judgment and decision making
More than 30 years of research have shown that people generally do 
not make decisions and judgments on the basis of a careful evaluation of 
expected outcome of the available options, as classical models predicted, 
but rather spontaneously rely on mental rules of thumb, called heuristics 
(Kahneman 2011, Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman 2002). These heuristics 
are in place because under ecologically relevant conditions they generate 
adequate responses. However, confronted with more complex and abstract 
situations, they tend to err, leading to persistent and systematic biases. For 
instance, when confronted with the Linda-problem1, people tend to solve 
1. The Linda-problem consists of a description of a bright, young, single woman 
called Linda who majored in philosophy, and was, as a student, very concerned 
about discrimination. Consequently, participants are asked which option is the 
 stephaan blancke
 are emotions reliable guide for policy? an evolutionary approach 41
  
© Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca Azafea. Rev. filos. 16, 2014, pp. 39-56
the puzzle by depending on how much Linda represents a particular social 
group, not by following basic logical rules, thus committing the conjunction 
fallacy (representativeness heuristic). When people are invited to gauge the 
probability of an event, they form their judgment not on the results of a 
statistical analysis, but rather they consult their memory for available and 
salient instances of that event (availability heuristic) (Kahneman 2011, 
Tversky & Kahneman 1974, Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman 2002). The 
discovery of these and other heuristics have led to the development of a 
model of the human mind, dual mind or dual process theory, that holds that 
the mind comprises at least two different types of mind (Kahneman 2011, 
Evans 2010 b). System 1, also called the intuitive or reflexive mind, operates 
fast and automatically, functions without much effort and stays largely below 
the radar of consciousness. This is the realm of the heuristics. System 2, the 
reflective mind, is the mind that we are consciously aware of; it is deliberative 
and voluntary and gives us the feeling that we are in control of our thoughts. 
However, this feeling is often illusory and system 2 readily and uncritically 
accepts the input provided by System 1 leading to errors as described above.
Originally the research focus lays on heuristics of a more cognitive nature 
such as the representativeness or availability heuristic. Later, however, 
instigated by earlier works of Slovic (1987), Zajonc (1980) and Damasio 
(1994), researchers have come to pay much attention to the influence of 
affect. Slovic and colleagues (2002), for instance, refer to several experiments 
to demonstrate that people, when making decisions or judgments, follow an 
affect, a feeling, that something is good or bad heuristic:
Representations of objects and events in people’s minds are tagged to varying 
degrees with affect. In the process of making a judgment or decision, people 
consult or refer to an “affect pool” containing all the positive and negative 
tags consciously or unconsciously associated with the representations. Just as 
imaginability, memorability, and similarity serve cues for probability judgments 
(e.g., the availability and representativeness heuristics), affect may serve as a cue 
for many important judgments (Slovic et al. 2002, 400).
According to Slovic and colleagues, the affect heuristic shows its face in 
many different situations, from the evaluation of gambles to the assessment 
of risk. With the latter, the affect heuristic touches upon the risks-as-feelings 
most probable. 1) Linda is a bank teller, or 2) Linda is a bank teller and a feminist. 
Although the probability of a conjunction can never be higher than the probability 
of one of its components, the majority of people tends to choose the second option, 
thus committing the conjunction fallacy.
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approach developed by Loewenstein and colleagues (2001). Loewenstein et 
al. argue convincingly that in order to assess risk, people often unconsciously 
rely on anticipatory emotions rather than upon cognitive evaluations. Not 
statistical data, but factors such as vividness of imagery and proximity in time 
determine how and to which extent feelings determine people’s judgment 
and the subsequent behavioral response. 
The fact that emotions exert considerable influence on judgment and 
decision making appears to be firmly established and is not under question 
in this chapter. Here we are more interested in the question whether the 
influence of emotions is a good or a bad thing. The answer of Slovic and his 
colleague to this question is ambivalent: 
[The affect] heuristic appears at once both wondrous and frightening: 
wondrous in its speed, and subtlety, and sophistication, and its ability to 
“lubricate reason”; frightening in its dependency upon context and experience, 
allowing us to be led astray or manipulated –inadvertently or intentionally– 
silently and invisibly” (Slovic et al. 2002, 420) 
However, Slovic and colleagues almost exclusively refer to studies in which 
affect can be easily manipulated and result in biases. As such, one might be 
tempted to conclude that they assume that the influence of emotions is not 
very reliable. Loewenstein et al. (2001) avoid making any explicit judgment 
about the desirability of the influence of feelings, but the way in which 
the authors juxtapose the impact of visceral emotions to the outcome of 
deliberate computations and the assessments of experts suggests that they too 
favor the latter. As such, one might feel tempted to conclude that the main 
thrust of studies on the impact of emotions within the dual process research 
tradition boils down to the idea that emotions are generally untrustworthy, 
lead to consistent biases and that their influence needs to be corrected by the 
reflective mind. 
2. Rational emotions? 
2.1. The moral rationality of emotions: Kass and Roeser
Not everyone agrees, however, that emotions mainly distract us from 
making calculated and objective decisions and judgments. Notoriously, Kass 
(1997) has argued that feelings of disgust reliably tell us that an unsurpassable 
moral barrier has been breached, for instance in the case of human cloning. 
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This he calls the wisdom of repugnance. History clearly shows, however, 
that phenomena once deemed disgusting are today entirely acceptable and 
vice versa, which strongly undermines Kass’s argument: how can we be sure 
that we can trust disgust in the case of human cloning? (Evans 2010 a, for a 
critique of Kass’ position, see Kelly 2011).
Roeser (2010, 2011, 2006) defends a similar, but somewhat more 
nuanced position. She claims that dual process theorists sidestep emotions 
as subjective and irrational. In her view, emotions are more than mere gut 
feelings that can be contrasted with cognitive reflection. Emotions bear a 
cognitive, reflective component and thus hold “critical potential” (Roeser 
2010, 239). Admittedly, Roeser argues, when emotions keep us from 
accurately assessing or even accepting scientific findings concerning the 
quantitative aspects of risk, then emotions lead to irrational conclusions 
and they need to corrected in light of the available evidence (Roeser 2010). 
Roeser, however, thinks that there is more to risk than its quantitative 
dimensions. There is also the moral dimension of risk to which experts 
have no privileged access. When it comes to these moral risks, emotions 
can be “an invaluable source of wisdom” (Roeser 2011, 198), “ethical 
insight” (197) and “practical rationality” (197). For instance, feelings of 
sympathy and responsibility allow us to imagine the fate of fellow humans 
and thus make crucial contributions to our moral reflections. When lay 
people depend on emotions to assess the risk of a particular technology, 
they are not being irrational, but they use the only available means by 
which they can include their ethical considerations. Experts who disregard 
this multifaceted nature of risk are said to be suffering from “complexity 
neglect” (Roeser 2010, 242). 
However, according to Roeser, even if emotions can offer important 
insights into the moral dimensions of risk, they are by no means infallible. 
As Roeser (2010, 239) notes: “Emotions are necessary for moral knowledge, 
but they are no guarantee for success. We need to critically examine our 
emotions, by exploiting the reflective and critical potential of emotions, which 
is given through their possibility of shifting points of view and caring for the 
wellbeing of others”. Indeed, in light of the evidence of emotions unjustifiably 
biasing people’s moral judgment, it would be difficult to maintain otherwise. 
This single sentence, however, beautifully captures two insurmountable 
weaknesses in Roeser’s position. First, granting that emotions are not infallible 
and need to be assessed critically implies that the evaluation of the normative 
weight of the emotion depends not upon the activation of the emotion itself, 
but upon criteria independent of the emotion. The fact that the emotion is 
activated does not in itself justify the moral judgment based on that emotion. 
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Seemingly, Roeser acknowledges this when she writes that “emotions such 
as sympathy, empathy, and compassion can point out unfair distributions of 
risks and benefits. Indignation and resentment can point to moral digressions 
such as involuntary risk impositions. Experts might feel responsible and 
worried about the technologies they develop. Fear might point to concern 
about unforeseen negative consequences of a technology. Disgust might point 
to the ambiguous moral status of, for example, clones and human-animal 
hybrids”. (Roeser 2011, 198, my italics) Feelings might and can, but whether 
they do appears to lie outside their normative reach. Roeser might object to 
the first point that the deliberation is not based on independent criteria, but 
upon feelings of empathy and sympathy (“shifting points of view” and “caring 
for the wellbeing of others”) (Roeser 2010, 239). Emotions have the potential 
to critically assess the effect of other emotions. 
This argument of critical potential constitutes the second weakness in 
Roeser’s argument, which is similar to the first: as sympathy and empathy are 
emotions themselves, the evaluative power of sympathy and the like does not 
depend on the nature of these emotions, but, again, on other criteria. Indeed, 
feelings of empathy are not trustworthy in and because of themselves. As 
Bloom has noted in his notorious piece called “Against empathy” (Bloom 
2014), the emotion itself can be biased (e.g., we feel more sympathy towards 
beautiful people) and narrow (e.g., we can empathize with the suffering of 
one single individual but disregard the torments of anonymous thousands). 
In other words, the evaluators need to be evaluated (and we have no recourse 
to emotions, otherwise we end up with a vicious circle). In sum, either as 
indicators of moral risk, or as evaluative faculties with critical potential, 
emotions can hardly be regarded as reliable tools. This conclusion does not 
deny that we need emotions to be moral. However, as Evans (2010 a) notices 
in his critique of safeguards views on moral risks, this is entirely a matter 
of empirical psychology. Even if emotions play an unavoidable role in our 
moral judgment and decision making, this does not entail that we should not 
treat their influence without suspicion (cf. De Sousa 2010).
2.2. The cultural rationality of emotions: Kahan
Another approach that questions the alleged irrationality of emotions is 
Kahan’s cultural evaluator theory (Kahan 2008). According to Kahan, the 
influence of emotions might appear to result in irrational conclusions or 
behavior from an objective, scientific point of view, a position he labels as 
the irrational weighter theory. However, for the individual, following their 
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emotions is a rational course of action, because emotions play an important 
role in aligning the individual’s judgment with their cultural values. Kahan 
explains:
The cultural evaluator theory views emotions as enabling individuals to 
perceive what stance toward risks coheres with their values. Cultural norms 
obviously play a role in shaping the emotional reactions people form toward 
activities such as nuclear power, handgun possession, homosexuality, and 
the like. When people draw on their emotions to judge the risk that such an 
activity poses, they form an expressively rational attitude about what it would 
mean for their cultural worldviews for society to credit the claim that that 
activity is dangerous and worthy of regulation (Kahan 2008, 750, my italics).
The irrationality of emotions is only apparent, but in fact, as they serve the 
purpose of calibrating an individual’s response to their cultural background, 
we might conclude that emotions are culturally rational. However, the 
question is whether this approach successfully safeguard emotions from the 
irrationality claim. I am afraid not. In fact, Kahan’s theory suffers the same 
weakness as Roeser’s approach. Kahan too acknowledges that even when 
one bears in mind the cultural rationality of emotions, their influence is not 
entirely foolproof: 
Recognizing that emotions enable persons to perceive expressive value 
doesn’t imply that the insight it imparts can never be challenged. Indeed, the 
idea that emotions express cognitive evaluations is historically conjoined to 
the position that emotions can and should be evaluated as true or false, right 
or wrong, reasonable or unreasonable, in light of the moral correctness of the 
values those emotions express (Kahan 2008, 762). 
Again, emotions in themselves are insufficient to warrant the claim that 
they are rational; they can only deserve that label by a critical reflection 
on the impact of the emotion in each and every case. Anger might be an 
appropriate and reasonable response in some circumstances (e.g., when 
someone harms your children), but not in others (e.g., towards a person 
with a different skin color). The strategy of using cultural values as standards 
to measure the appropriateness of emotions runs aground on the fact that 
moral values themselves are not just for the take. Values too need to be and 
are continuously evaluated in terms of the harm and benefits they cause, 
of whether or not they hinge on accurate views concerning a particular 
phenomenon, and of their relation to other values. Values in themselves 
do not and cannot make emotions rational. What makes them rational is 
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whether they stand up against a critical and balanced evaluation of their 
effects. Moreover, even if emotions were truly culturally rational, this would 
not make them rational in the context of assessing risks. 
2.3. Implications for policy, communication and education
Both Roeser and Kahan draw implications of their respective theory for the 
role of emotions in policy making and science education and communication. 
Unsurprisingly, both think it necessary to credit emotions with a more positive 
role. Roeser claims “policy making about risky technologies should do justice 
to emotions as an invaluable source of ethical insight” (Roeser 2010, 241) 
and proposes “the arguments, reasons and considerations that are revealed 
by or lie behind emotional responses to technological risks and benefits have 
to be taken seriously” (Roeser 2010, 241). She concludes: “Emotions and 
scientific methods should be in a good balance when thinking about risks: 
where science can inform us about magnitudes, emotions inform us about 
moral saliences. Both kinds of information are inevitable if we want to make 
well-grounded judgments about acceptable risks” (Roeser 2010, 242). Kahan 
focuses more on the implications for education and communication: “The 
prospects for making members of the public receptive to sound empirical 
information, then, doesn’t depend on whether they can be trained not to 
apprehend risk through their emotions; it depends on whether scientifically 
sound information can be made to bear a social meaning that fits citizens’ 
cultural values” (Kahan 2008, 764) As such, “information about risks must 
be framed in a way that affirms rather than denigrates recipients’ cultural 
identities; to make it possible for persons of diverse cultural persuasions to 
experience that affirmation simultaneously –and thus reach consensus on a 
contested risk issue– the information must be framed in a way that expresses 
a plurality of social meanings” (Kahan 2008, 765).
Interestingly, both Roeser’s and Kahan’s recommendations on how to 
deal with emotions stand even if one does not accept their claims about the 
rationality of emotions. For policy, education and communication purposes, 
and even for democratic reasons, it can be simply sound practice to take 
emotional responses into account. People get the feeling that decisions are not 
being forced upon them and that they are being taken seriously, and they are; 
developing and following strategies that explicitly address concerns driven 
by emotions can facilitate considerably the public acceptance of a particular 
technology or policy; and the literature in conceptual change (Vosniadou 2008) 
suggests that educational approaches that deal with conceptions inspired and 
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strengthened by emotional appraisals will have more success to improve the 
understanding of (the nature, the applications and implications of) a particular 
technology. In sum, emotions can be taken seriously at many different levels 
and many different ways. However, given the fact that emotions can misguide 
us, it is questionable whether emotions should play an important role in 
policy making. 
A serious hiatus in both Roeser’s and Kahan’s theory, is that they fail 
to account for how emotions came to perform their purported function, 
respectively as an ethical guide or as an expression of one’s cultural values. 
Where, how and why did emotions acquire the capacity to point to genuine 
moral concerns? What process drove emotions into the role of cultural 
evaluation? Does that process generate reliable results? Was that their original 
function or have they been co-opted? Both Roeser and Kahan remain silent 
on these questions. However, by answering them, we could go a long way 
determining whether we can trust emotions as guides for assessing the risks of 
modern technologies. What we need is an evolutionary approach to emotions.
3. Evolution of emotions
3.1. Why are emotions?
Bringing an evolutionary perspective to the study of judgment and 
decision making and to the assessment of risk in particular is not new. In 
fact, it lies implicit in the heuristics and biases approach (Gilovich, Griffin, 
and Kahneman 2002, Kahneman 2011). The heuristics that make up System 
1 are generally described as adaptive, meaning that they are in place because 
on average they automatically and spontaneously generated adequate 
solutions to problems faced by our ancestors such as finding a mate, 
collecting food, navigating social contacts, etc. In the struggle for survival, 
only organisms that responded quickly and aptly in response to threats and 
opportunities survived. In most cases, there was simply no time and energy 
to calculate and compare the outcomes of the different options available. 
Moreover, taking into account too much information leads to perplexity 
and indecisiveness, which in evolutionary terms means almost certain death. 
The same reasoning applies to the affect heuristic (Slovic et al., 2002). By 
allowing people to respond to particular events and situations by tagging 
them with a positive or negative feeling, the heuristic is believed to offer 
a quick and dirty, but adequate solution to problems that would take too 
long to calculate carefully. Because they function automatically and without 
much reflective interference, it is no surprise that they sometimes go awry. In 
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their risks as feelings approach, Loewenstein and colleagues (2001) identify 
evolutionary preparedness as one of the determinants of the influence of 
feelings. For instance, people have no problem facing lethal traffic day in 
day out, while they might be terrified by a small, innocent spider. The reason 
is that spiders constituted a real threat in our ancestral environment; hence 
our brain evolved a predisposition to develop a fear of spiders. Automobiles 
however were completely absent in the world of our ancestors and 150 years 
is simply too short a period for natural selection to adapt the brain to this 
modern hazard. 
Despite the fact that the heuristics and biases approach builds on 
an evolutionary perspective, it has, unfortunately, not developed that 
perspective to its fullest potential (Fessler, Pillsworth, and Flamson 2004). 
Here, however, I will not expand on the evolution of emotions to explain 
how such an account may shed new light on risk assessment. Instead, I 
will focus on how an evolutionary account may help us settle the question 
whether emotions are trustworthy indicators of risk and whether they can 
be used as guides for policy making. Taking an evolutionary perspective 
to emotions implies that one looks for the function of emotions, as Roeser 
and Kahan did. However, instead of looking for functions that emotions 
might perform nowadays, an evolutionary approach searches for functions 
at the ultimate level, that is the functions emotions evolved to perform 
in our ancestral environment. In other words, an evolutionary approach 
is concerned with emotions’ adaptive function. This adaptive function 
not only explains why emotions are in place, but also accounts for their 
properties: Why do emotions take on the form that they do? Why do they 
respond to certain cues and not to others? As such, these evolved properties 
explain both the reach and constraints of emotions (Tooby & Cosmides 
2008, Haselton & Ketelaar 2006). 
Evolutionary psychologists have developed several scenarios to account 
for the existence of emotions (Haselton, Nettle, & Andrews 2005). Frank 
(1988) has argued that emotions can be viewed as commitment devices that 
enabled our human ancestors to pursue long-term strategies while forfeiting 
short-term temptations. Love, for instance, binds people into long-lasting 
relationships, forgoing mating opportunities that might bring immediate 
benefits but that deter us from reaping the benefits in the long run. Frank’s 
theory has some experimental backup but it fails to account for emotions such 
as fear and disgust, which do not seem to display or maintain any commitment 
(Kelly 2011). Tooby and Cosmides (2008) have suggested a more inclusive 
theory that views emotions as superordinate cognitive programs. They 
argue that the human mind consists of multiple domain-specific mechanisms 
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dealing with perception, memory, attention, etc., the output of which needs 
to be coordinated into a coherent behavioral pattern in response to particular 
adaptive problems. Emotions perform that coordinating function. As such, 
they form complexes of mental and behavioral programs that include much 
more than the subjective experience we commonly associate with emotions2.
3.2. Are our evolved emotions trustworthy?
The fact that different emotions evolved in response to different adaptive 
challenges must caution us about drawing conclusions about the trustworthiness 
of emotions in general. Each emotion becomes triggered by specific conditions, 
comes with a typical set of behavioral responses and might be more or less 
error prone. In addition, we might even have to revise our folk categories such 
as disgust, fear, etc. to make room for more fine-grained divisions that cut the 
emotions at their joints (see Tybur et al. 2013 for an evolutionary analysis of 
disgust), which makes the situation even more complex. Nevertheless, despite 
the diversity, based on emotions’ evolutionary origins, we can at least make a 
number of general remarks about their reliability. First, emotions evolved to 
generate adequate behavior in response to particular adaptive problems; they 
are not concerned with producing scientifically accurate assessments of risk. 
They become triggered when they are confronted with cues that sufficiently 
resemble ecological relevant conditions in the ancestral environment. Tooby 
and Cosmides aptly describe emotions as bets:
[An emotion] is the evolved mind’s bet about what internal deployment is 
likely to lead to the best average long-term set of payoffs, given the structure 
and statistical contingencies present in the ancestral world when a particular 
situation was encountered. Running away in terror, vomiting in disgust, or 
attacking in rage are bets that are placed because these responses had the 
highest average payoffs for our ancestors, given the eliciting conditions (Tooby 
& Cosmides 2008, 117).
But just as every other bet, emotions can be mistaken. Moreover, the 
tendency to err is actually built into the detection system of emotions that 
are involved with the gauging of risk such as fear and disgust. Because of 
the unequal distribution of potential costs, these emotions do not tend to 
2. Limitations of space prevent me from discussing the notion of ecological 
rationality. However, it is unlikely that this approach makes emotions more reliable. 
For a general discussion, see Boudry, Vlerick & Mckay 2014, in press.
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err in any old way, but on the side of caution (cf. Haselton & Buss 2000). 
False positives will be far more common than false negatives. To infer that 
the wind rustling in the leaves indicates the presence of a predator is far 
less costly than to take a predator for the wind. To forfeit a nutritious meal 
under the suspicion that it carries pathogens is a less dramatic mistake than 
to consume a possibly sickening meal. As a result, emotions will be activated 
much more often than the circumstances require. 
In modern times, the emotions’ vulnerability becomes even more 
pronounced. To understand why, it might be helpful to introduce the distinction 
between a mental mechanism’s proper and actual domain, a distinction first 
proposed by the French anthropologist and philosopher Dan Sperber (1996, 
134-138). The proper domain of a mental mechanism is the collection of 
adaptive problems the mechanism evolved to neutralize. The actual domain is 
the collection of environmental cues that are able to trigger the mechanism into 
action. The proper domain of disgust, for instance, is possible contaminating 
sources and poisons, whereas the actual domain comprises everything that 
elicits disgust. Situations do not have to pose a real threat or adaptive challenge 
to elicit a response from our evolved mechanisms, including emotions; they 
only need to mimic the conditions that the mechanism has evolved to respond 
to. Our modern cultural environment largely consists of such situations and 
conditions. We have moved far away from the ancestral environment that 
shaped our mind. However, this means that emotions will often respond to 
situations for which they are not well equipped to deal with. Add this to the 
hypersensitivity of emotions, and we can conclude that, in modern society, 
emotions are very likely to react for no good reason. As such, we should not 
trust our emotions at face value, especially when they respond to complex 
issue such as modern technologies. 
3.3. Emotions and technologies: the case of GMOs
Indeed, modern technologies form a prime example of situations 
that did not exist in the ancestral environment. Hence, we can expect 
that when people respond to them emotionally, that their response will 
not be necessarily attenuated to the actual risks these technologies pose. 
For instance, since genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have been 
commercialized since the 1990s, public opinion has turned against the 
technology, particularly in Europe. Under the influence of campaigns 
orchestrated by environmental groups such as Greenpeace and Friends 
of the Earth, people became increasingly worried about the risks this 
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technology would pose for their health and the environment. They also 
became suspicious that the technology only served the best interest of 
industry and the big farmers at the expense of the small farmers, particularly 
in the developing countries. From 1999 to 2004, in the European Union, a 
de facto moratorium put the commercialization of GMOs effectively on 
hold and, today, before any application can be released onto the European 
market it has to abide by very strict and expensive regulations. However, 
the evidence has abundantly shown that the concerns about health and 
environmental are entirely unsubstantiated and that local farmers too (and 
their families and communities) have benefited considerably from using the 
technology (e.g., Qaim 2010, Brookes & Barfoot 2011, D’Agnolo 2005). 
Moreover, applications such as golden rice may actually improve health 
conditions of people living in developing countries and thus help to save 
thousands of lives. Other applications make considerable contributions to 
the development of a sustainable form of agriculture and some argue that 
the technology can even be integrated into organic farming (e.g., Ammann 
2008). Yet, the public opposition to the technology remains formidable and 
sometimes even becomes quite aggressive when field trials are charged and 
destroyed. How can we explain this paradox?
Patterns in surveys inquiring about people’s opinion about GMOs and in 
the representations of GMOs by anti-GMO activists strongly suggest that 
the resistance is largely driven by emotions, particularly by disgust. Disgust is 
an emotion that Steven Pinker (1997) describes as our intuitive microbiology. 
Before we became aware of the existence of microbes, disgust alerted us of 
their presence. The emotion steers us away from possibly contaminating 
sources and poison, thus preventing us to take in or get into contact with 
sickening and even lethal substances. As such, objects that trigger the emotion 
are either pathogenic or indicative of the presence of pathogens. These triggers 
include feces, corpses, blood, ulcers and maggots, for example. The mouth is 
an important way by which pathogens can enter the body, so food is another 
important category that disgust is concerned with (Kelly 2011). Surveys 
disclose that people tend to be more averse of GM applications that are 
grown for food than for something else, such as clothes or biofuels (Gaskell 
et al. 2010). They tend to be scared that GM food is poisonous, that it will 
cause sterility and diseases such as cancer and they worry that GM crops 
will contaminate the environment. The very nature of these concerns (illness, 
poison, contamination) indicates the involvement of disgust. Anti-GMO 
groups have successfully tapped into feelings of disgust. They distributed 
edited images of children with clear signs of disease consuming GM food; a 
dead mouse lies dead next to a corn it has just nibbled on, and so on. A recent, 
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fraudulent paper that allegedly demonstrated that GMOs cause cancer in rats 
contained images of rats with enormous ulcers that were subsequently widely 
dispersed via the media (Séralini et al. 2012, see also European Food Safety 
Authority 2012). The influence of disgust would also explain why not only 
the scientists who developed the technology, but also the environmentalist 
groups themselves were taken by surprise by the success of the campaign. 
When ideas are able to hitchhike on feelings of disgust, they stand a far greater 
chance of spreading through a culture than non-disgusting ideas (Heath, Bell, 
& Sternberg 2001, Nichols 2002). More importantly, the influence of disgust 
could also explain why people continue to oppose the technology. They 
assess the risks involved not by relying on a balanced analysis of the costs and 
benefits, but on rather viscerally responses to the technology. Disgust emerges 
because agricultural applications for agriculture, especially when grown for 
food, display sufficient signals that alert the disgust system. The reason might 
be that people consider an organism’s DNA to constitute its essence (on 
essentialism, see Gelman 2004) and that the essence becomes “contaminated” 
with alien DNA, in particular when the DNA is derived from organisms that 
are commonly deemed disgusting, such as rats. The resulting effect is that 
people come to oppose a technology that actually has enormous potential of 
realizing the very goals that people find important (Blancke, Van Breusegem, 
De Jaeger, Braeckman, Van Montagu, 2015, in press)3. 
Moreover, in modern society, emotions do not only detect and respond 
to illusory risks. Some technologies bear so few resemblances to threats 
common in the ancestral environment that emotions completely fail to 
notice the risks involved (Loewenstein et al. 2001). Many people are deeply 
concerned about nuclear energy, which is relatively safe, but are not the least 
worried about the impact of charcoal plants, which in fact costs thousands 
of lives annually (Brand 2009, 81). Hence, the complexity of modern times 
appears to confuse our evolved emotions, leading them to churn both false 
positives and false negatives. As such, it becomes clear that emotions do not 
constitute a very trustworthy basis on which one can develop a policy that 
adequately meets the environmental and social challenges that humanity has 
to deal with. 
3. This does not entail that any concern about GMOs is necessarily emotionally 
driven and/or unsubstantiated. Some applications might have some disadvantages (as 
do products of conventional breeding), but that needs to be assessed on a case-to-case 
basis. However, emotions appear to blind people for these important distinctions, 
leading them to reject GMOs as a whole on the basis of unfounded arguments. 
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4. Conclusions
Emotions undeniably affect people’s risk assessment, but the question is 
whether that is a good thing or not. Scientists working in the field of heuristics 
and biases seem to be quite skeptical about the impact of emotions, because 
emotions tend to lead people to prefer irrational outcomes. Some philosophers 
such as Roeser and Kahan however think that emotions are rational, at least to 
a certain extent, and should be taken into consideration when building policy 
and in science education and communication. Based on the evolutionary 
analysis above, and for reasons explained earlier, one can perfectly agree with 
the latter conclusion, but not with the former. Because of their evolutionary 
history, emotions are simply not well equipped to deal with complex and 
difficult tasks such as assessing the risks of modern technologies. Hence, it is 
better not to trust them as guides to develop policy. We might end up taking 
decisions that have the opposite effect of what we are trying to achieve.
Besides communication and education, there is at least one more way in 
which we can take emotions seriously. If emotions have such a great effect 
on the way people respond to technologies, we can appeal to those emotions 
to make technologies more attractive (Evans 2010 a). Studies suggest, for 
instance, that emphasizing the benefits helps people to accept technologies 
that otherwise would induce public opposition. This might sound as cold 
manipulation of the masses, but in the light of the goods that technologies 
deliver and given sufficient transparency, such paternalism might be called 
for to balance the inescapable impact of emotions.
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